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Abstract
In this paper, we present the results of a Learning-to-Forecast Ex-
periment (LtFE) where we eliciting short- as well as long-run expecta-
tions regarding the future price dynamics in markets with positive and
negative expectations feedback. Comparing our results on short-run
expectations with the LtFE literature, we prove that eliciting long-run
expectations has no impact on the price dynamics nor on short-run
expectations formation. In particular, we confirm that the Rational
Expectation Equilibrium (REE) is a good benchmark only for the mar-
kets with negative feedback. Interestingly, our data show that while
the term structure of the cross-sectional dispersion of expectations is
convex in positive feedback markets, it is concave in negative feedback
markets. Differences in the slope of the term structure stem from di-
verse degrees of uncertainty regarding the evolution of prices in the
two feedback systems: (i) in the negative feedback system, the conver-
gence of the price to the REE reflects a tendency for coordination of
long-run expectations around the fundamental value; (ii) conversely,
oscillatory price dynamics observed in the positive feedback system is
responsible for the diverging pattern of long-run expectations. Finally,
we propose a new measure of heterogeneity of expectations based on
the scaling of the dispersion of expectations over the forecasting hori-
zon.
keywords: Long-Run Expectations; Heterogeneous Expectations;
Experiment; Coordination; Convergence; Learning-to-Forecast Exper-
iment. JEL: D03, G12, C91
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1 Introduction
The expectations of an economic agent regarding the future state of the
economy affects his/her current individual choices. Thus, when aggregat-
ing all individual choices, expectations of agents influence the realizations
of macroeconomic quantities. At the same time, the evolution of macroeco-
nomic aggregates has an impact on how agents form and revise their expec-
tations. The economy can therefore be modelled as an expectations feedback
system. Consequently, how agents form their expectations at the individual
level plays an important role in understanding the dynamics of the aggregate
outcome. The rational expectations framework provides a normative indica-
tion of how expectations should be consistently formed within a given model.
In the framework of rational expectations, agents share a common expecta-
tions formation mechanism. In order to introduce heterogeneity within the
rational expectations framework, Mankiw et al. (2003) propose a sticky in-
formation model, where they assume that agents follow rational expectations
and update their information set at different moments, taking into account
acquisition and computation costs. Therefore, the heterogeneity of expec-
tations emerges from the agents’ heterogeneous information set. We find,
however, numerous examples in the theoretical, computational and experi-
mental literature that rely on bounded rationality to introduce heterogeneity
in the formation of the agents’ expectations (see Hommes (2013) and refer-
ences therein).
The origin of heterogeneity across individual expectations and the role
that it plays in shaping aggregate outcomes is an important topic in theo-
retical as well as empirical research in macroeconomics. The fact that ex-
pectations are not directly observable in the same way as prices or volumes,
means that there is a significant limitation when it comes to fully under-
standing their precise role in driving macroeconomic aggregates.
Conducting forecasting surveys is one of the traditional methods used
to elicit individual expectations (see Manski (2004)). This methodology has
been extensively used in macroeconomics, e.g. in testing the accuracy and ra-
tionality of forecasters. Only recently has disagreement about expectations,
measured as the cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts, and its evolution over
time, become in itself a variable of interest. It seems to contain information
about, for example, the uncertainty about future development of business
cycles or inflation rates (see Mankiw et al. (2003)). In order to disentan-
gle whether the origin of the observed forecast’ dispersion is a measure of
the intrinsic uncertainty of macroeconomic variables or if it reflects heteroge-
neous priors of forecasters, Patton and Timmermann (2010) focus on how the
dispersion of expectations evolves over different time horizons. They study
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the term structure of cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts, observing that it
typically increases with the forecast horizon. Their analysis reveals that such
persistent heterogeneity of expectations among forecasters in the short-run
stems from different private information, whereas in the long-run it is due to
the forecasters heterogeneity regarding their prior and/or prediction models.
Laboratory experiments, such as surveys, allows us to directly elicit in-
dividual expectations, with the additional advantages of monitoring the in-
formation available to the subjects and using performance-based incentives.
Within the experimental literature, LtFEs, introduced by Marimon et al.
(1993), make it possible to study the formation of individual expectations
within different expectations feedback systems, where the price depends on
subjects’ predictions. By using this experimental framework, many experi-
ments investigate the expectations of agents in financial markets (Hommes
et al. (2005), Bao and Ding (2016)), commodity markets (Bao et al. (2013))
and aslo in a macroeconomic framework (Assenza et al. (2011), Cornand and
M’baye (2016)), to cite just a few contributions. In these articles, subjects
have to predict prices within a 1 or 2 step-ahead horizon. One of the most
pervasive results is that subjects show a certain degree of heterogeneity in
their predictions, which seems to decrease over time. However, the reported
level of heterogeneity is based on subjects’ short-run predictions only, which
might distort the evaluation of their level of disagreement.
In order to explain the disagreement among subjects’ predictions, the
literature on LtFEs argued that subjects follow heterogeneous anchor-and-
adjustment rules, anchoring their expectations to past prices.1 The dynam-
ics of prices depends crucially on the expectations feedback system, showing
large oscillations around the fundamental value under a positive feedback
system and a fast convergence to the fundamental value under a negative
feedback system. We might think that the evolution of the level of dis-
agreement among subjects over time and across multiple forecast horizons
is directly affected by the price dynamics observed under the two feedback
systems.
Although there is an extensive macroeconomic literature that measures
the term structure of forecasts using survey data to study the disagreement
in expectations, the empirical characterization of the term structure of ex-
pectations in LtFEs is still missing. The aim of our paper is to investigate
the impact of the expectations feedback system on the formation of long-run
1Anufriev and Hommes (2012) and Hommes (2013) introduce an heterogeneous expec-
tations model showing that a set of different anchor-and-adjustment rules can successfully
reproduce experimental data in a LtFE eliciting short-run expectations. Colasante et al.
(2018a,b) show that subjects do indeed anchor their short- and long-run expectations to
the last realized price in a positive feedback system.
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expectations as well as the empirical characterization of the term structure
of subjects’ predictions. The term structure analysis allows us to have a
more precise idea regarding the level of disagreement among subjects. In
fact, if we do not consider a broader spectrum of expectations, we could lead
us to underestimate or overestimate subjects’ disagreement. As an exam-
ple, let us consider a scenario where subjects exhibit a strong coordination
of their short-run forecasts together with an increasing dispersion of their
long-run expectations. Measuring subjects’ disagreement as the variance of
their short-run forecasts would lead us to underestimate the level of disagree-
ment among subjects. On the contrary, we can imagine a situation where
a higher dispersion of short-run forecasts, compared to the first scenario,
remains constant or decreases over different forecast horizons (constant or
decreasing term structure). In this case, we may overestimate subjects’ dis-
agreement. We take the position that the term structure of expectations
provides crucial information when it comes to characterizing the heterogene-
ity of expectations in LtFEs, and therefore long-run expectations cannot be
ignored.
We conduct a LtFE in which, unlike the standard settings2, subjects sub-
mit their predictions for periods ranging from 1 to more than 10-step-ahead
time horizon. We elicit subjects’ long-run expectations at the beginning of
every period, making it possible to revise their expectations as new informa-
tion becomes available. In particular, we extend the novel setting introduced
by Colasante et al. (2018a) and compare two different expectations feedback
systems. As in Heemeijer et al. (2009), we compare two treatments: one
with a positive feedback system and the other with a negative one. The pos-
itive feedback system mimics the behavior of financial markets where prices
typically rise if investors expect positive changes. Conversely, the negative
feedback system simulates commodity markets where, due to the delay in
the production adjustment, market prices move in the opposite direction to
expectations.
Our results on coordination and convergence of short-run expectations, as
well as on the evolution of prices, are in line with those reported in the LtFEs
literature (see Hommes (2013)). We propose a one-parameter term structure
model to characterize the degree of disagreement of expectations in the two
treatments. This characterization provides us with relevant information on
how subjects form their long-run expectations. Extending the forecasting
horizon reveals that subjects learn the REE in markets with negative feed-
back. We observe that the dispersion of long-run expectations around the
2For a comprehensive survey of macroeconomic experiments on expectations see As-
senza et al. (2014).
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fundamental price decreases over time to reach almost full convergence to the
REE. By estimating the term structure of expectations, we demonstrate that
mutual coordination of expectations and their convergence to the fundamen-
tal price follow the same pattern. In contrast, in the market with positive
feedback, we find a persistently high level of disagreement among forecasters
and it is compatible with the heterogeneous extrapolative rules employed by
subjects when forming their expectations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the
experimental setting, while section 3 introduces the theoretical framework
and the working hypotheses. Section 4 presents the results of our empirical
analysis, and finally, section 5 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
2 Experimental Design
We conduct a LtFE similar to Colasante et al. (2018a) where the subjects’
task is to forecast the evolution of prices at different time horizons. In or-
der to test the effect of the feedback system on expectations formation, we
implement two treatments: in the first, we consider a market with positive
feedback, while in the second treatment we consider a market with negative
feedback between the expectations of subjects and the market price.3
Each market consists of six subjects playing the role of professional fore-
casters for 20 periods (see the translated instructions in Appendix B.1). Sub-
jects are asked to submit their short- and long-run price predictions. This
means that, at the beginning of period t, subject i submits his/her short-run
prediction for the market price at the end of period t, denoted as ip
e
t,t, as
well as his/her set of long-run predictions for the price at the end of each
one of the 20 − t remaining periods. Long-run predictions are denoted as
ip
e
t,t+kwith 1 ≤ k ≤ 20− t.4
We implement the price adjustment mechanism proposed by Heemeijer
et al. (2009) and employed by Colasante et al. (2018a) in a LtFE which elicits
long-run expectations. In the positive feedback treatment the realized price
depends positively on the average short-run price forecasts. The adjustment
mechanism is as follows:
pt = pf +
1
1 + r
(p̄et,t − pf ) + εt . (1)
3For the positive feedback treatment we use the dataset from Colasante et al. (2018a).
4Although within our experimental setting we collect 20 1-step-ahead predictions from
each subject instead of 50 as in most LtFEs, we can monitor the entire time-spectrum of
expectations and its evolution over time.
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In the negative feedback treatment the realized price in each period depends
negatively on the average subjects’ short-run forecasts and is computed as
follows:
pt = pf −
1
1 + r
(p̄et,t − pf ) + εt , (2)




and d is equal to 3.5 or 3.25 depending on the session.5 The term
p̄et,t in the pricing equations is the average of the six 1-step-ahead predictions






t,t. Finally, the term
εt ∼ N(0, 0.25) is an iid normal shock. The main difference between eq. (1)
and eq. (2) is how expectations affect the price: eq. (1) describes a positive
feedback system where subjects predictions are self-fulfilling, i.e. the higher
the average forecast is, the higher the price will be; eq. (2), on the other hand,
describes a system in which there is a negative feedback between expectations
and price.
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t−j,t represents the individual profit
associated with the accuracy of the prediction submitted by subject i at the
beginning of period t−j about the asset price in period t, where 1 ≤ j ≤ t−1.





25 if 0 ≤ iδt−j,t ≤ 5
12 if 5 < iδt−j,t ≤ 10
5 if 10 < iδt−j,t ≤ 15
0 otherwise
where iδt−j,t = |ipet−j,t − pt|. The total profit of each subject is the sum of
5The values of the interest rate and average dividend are constant through a given
session. To avoid the effects of communication among subjects between sessions, we set
two different values of the dividend, so that we have some markets with a fundamental
price of 65 and others with 70.
6We used a payoff mechanism similar to Haruvy et al. (2007).
6
profits across all periods.7 Note that we use a step-function instead of a
smooth payoff function similar to eq. (3) to compute the profit for long-
run predictions. Whereas subjects receive an immediate feedback on the
forecasting errors of their short-run predictions, they experience a certain
delay in evaluating the accuracy of their long-run predictions. Forecasting
prices in the long-run is a more difficult task than forecasting short-run prices.
It is for this reason that we consider that a step function guarantees to the
subjects an easier evaluation of their long-run forecasting accuracy.8 In order
to reward the short-run predictions of the subjects, we consider a hyperbolic
function so as not to “force” subjects to coordinate. For small forecasting
errors (i.e. ζi,t < 1), eq. (3) exhibits a parabolic shape as the function
proposed by Hommes et al. (2004) and Heemeijer et al. (2009), while, for
larger forecasting errors, it gradually approaches the zero lower bound of the
payoff.
The information set available to the subjects when submitting their pre-
dictions is the following: the interest rate (r), the average dividend (d) (in
the positive feedback treatment), the time series of prices up to period t− 1
as well as all their own (short and long-run) past predictions. Profits are
calculated at the end of each period and subjects receive information about
the earnings of the last period together with the cumulative profit up to the
current period. We provide qualitative information about the implemented
feedback system, i.e. whether there is a positive or negative relationship be-
tween subjects’ 1-step-ahead predictions and the realized price. Equations
(1), (2) and (3) are not given to the subjects. To be sure that all subjects
correctly understand the information provided in the instructions, the exper-
imenter explains the instructions when presenting the software. During this
presentation, subjects are informed that the market price is computed using
their 1-step-ahead predictions.9 In order to give the subjects some reference
point as to how short-term predictions are rewarded, they are informed that
the maximum payoff for each 1-step-ahead prediction is 250 ECU and that
this amount falls with the forecasting error, reaching a value close to zero
when the forecasting error is larger than 15.
7We assigned the same weight to short and long-run predictions in the subjects’ fi-










8We conducted additional sessions for negative as well as positive feedback treatments
and implemented a rescaled hyperbolic continuous payoff function for both, long and short-
run predictions. Results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those described in
the present paper (material available upon request).
9In the software, 1-step-ahead predictions (in green) have a different colour from long-
term predictions(in black). A screenshot of the experiment is shown in Appendix B.2.
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The experimental sessions were conducted in the Laboratory of Experi-
mental Economics at the Jaume I University. A total of 90 subjects10 par-
ticipated and 15 markets were implemented: 7 with positive feedback and 8
with negative feedback. Each session lasted approximatively 50 minutes and
the average gain was of 20 Euros.
3 Working Hypotheses
Given the adjustment mechanism in eqs. (1) and (2), the REE predicts that
the realized price pt converges to the fundamental value with fairly small
fluctuations proportional to the idiosyncratic shock term εt. If we assume
that all subjects follow rational expectations, their predictions submitted
in each period t and for each forecast horizon k fluctuate around the con-
stant fundamental value irrespective of the expectations feedback system,
i.e. ip
e
t,t+k ≈ pf . Plugging this condition into eqs. (1) and (2), we obtain
pt = pf + εt.
3.1 Short-run predictions
In our experimental setting, the REE does not depend on the expectations
feedback system. On the contrary, as routinely identified in the LtFE lit-
erature, the feedback system plays a crucial role in whether and how prices
converge to the REE and in the dynamics of the coordination of expectations.
Following the general theoretical predictions of Haltiwanger and Waldman
(1989), in the case of markets with positive feedback, subjects’ short-run
expectations can be considered as strategic complements. In these markets,
therefore, subjects have a strong incentive to mutually coordinate their short-
run predictions although not necessarily with the REE. The convergence to
the REE is indeed difficult to achieve, since it requires that (almost) all
subjects’ expectations are coordinated around the fundamental value. In
markets with negative feedback, subjects’ expectations can be considered as
strategic substitutes, so that subjects have an incentive to predict low (high)
prices when they expect that the other subjects will predict high (low) prices.
Consequently, in these markets we expect to see a lower degree of coordina-
tion of subjects’ short-run expectations. Moreover, the convergence to the
REE is more likely to be observed, since it is sufficient for expectations to be
(on average) close to the fundamental value, instead of the more stringent
10Each subject participated in only one session and had not previously taken part in
LtFEs.
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conditions of the positive feedback, where (almost) all subjects’ expectations
should coordinate around pf .
By means of LtFEs, Heemeijer et al. (2009) show that the dynamics
of individual 1-step-ahead price predictions, as well as the dynamics of the
realized price, largely depend on the particular nature of the expectations
feedback system, which confirms the general theoretical predictions of Halti-
wanger and Waldman (1989). In particular, Heemeijer et al. (2009) find
that, in markets with positive feedback, subjects coordinate their individual
one-step-ahead predictions in a few periods, while the realized price needs a
much longer number of periods to achieve some degree of convergence to the
fundamental value. On the contrary, under negative feedback, the realized
price exhibits a fast convergence to the fundamental value, whereas subjects’
predictions need a slightly higher number of periods to coordinate. Unlike
markets with positive feedback, the coordination of short-run predictions is
almost parallel to their convergence to the fundamental value.
Since our experimental setting shares the main characteristics of the ex-
periment reported in Heemeijer et al. (2009), we expect to observe similar
time series properties of prices and short-run predictions depending on the
feedback system.
Hypothesis 1a: Markets with positive feedback are characterized by a coor-
dination of short-run predictions within a few periods and a slow convergence
of the realized price to the fundamental value.
Hypothesis 1b: Markets with negative feedback are characterized by a
faster convergence of the realized price to the fundamental value with a si-
multaneous coordination of short-run predictions.
If Hypotheses 1a and 1b are not rejected, we can argue that eliciting long-
run expectations has no significant effect on the subjects’ short-run predic-
tions nor on realized price dynamics in the positive as well as in the negative
expectations feedback system.11
3.2 The term structure of the cross-sectional disper-
sion of subjects’ predictions
When eliciting their long-run expectations, at the beginning of period t sub-
jects submit their price predictions for the end of period t+ k, for all k > 0.
11Colasante et al. (2018b) show that Hypothesis 1a cannot be rejected in the positive
expectations feedback system.
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According to eqs. (1) and (2), the price at the end of period t + k depends
on the subjects’ short-run predictions submitted at the beginning of period
t + k. Therefore, each subject should guesstimate, k-periods in advance,
the short-run expectations of the other subjects. We expect that long-run
predictions exhibit a lower degree of coordination, or equivalently a higher
degree of disagreement, the longer the forecast horizon is, given the increas-
ing uncertainty in guesstimating the future short-run behavior of the other
subjects.
In order to better characterize the level of disagreement among subjects
by also considering its evolution over time under the different feedback sys-
tems, we analyze the term structure of the cross-sectional dispersion of sub-
jects’ predictions across different forecast horizons. Our conjecture is that
the shape of the term structure is qualitatively different depending on the
expectations feedback system. To illustrate more precisely our conjecture
concerning the shape of the term structure of subjects’ predictions, let us
assume that subjects anchor their long-run expectations to the last realized
price and linearly extrapolate the past price change. We assume that each
subject has an ex-ante different prior on the extrapolation coefficient mi, and,
for simplicity, we consider that all coefficients are independent of the period
and the forecast horizon. Coefficient mi can be interpreted as the strength of
the trend extrapolation.12 The (short- and long-run) expectations formation
rule can be formalized as follows:
ip
e
t,t+k = pt−1 +mi (k + 1)(pt−1 − pt−2) , (4)
where 0 ≤ k ≤ K, and K is the maximum forecasting horizon.13 Note that,
according to eq. (4), the only source of heterogeneity among subjects in
the formation of expectations is directly linked to their different priors on
mi. The value of the variance of subjects’ predictions for a given period and
forecasting horizon is a proxy for their degree of disagreement. From eq. (4),
it is possible to show that (see Appendix A for the calculation details.):14
Var[ip
e
t,t+k] = Var[mi] (k + 1)
2(pt−1 − pt−2)2 = (k + 1)2 Var[ipet,t] . (5)
Eq. (5) describes the term structure of cross-sectional dispersion of ex-
pectations conditionally on the rule given by eq. (4).
12The Heuristic Switching Model, introduced by Anufriev and Hommes (2012), is an
example of a model with heterogeneous extrapolation strengths.
13A cautionary note is in order here: eq. (4) does not intend to be a precise descrip-
tion of the behavior of the subjects when forming their expectations; instead it should
be considered as a simple mathematical formalization helping us to better illustrate our
conjecture.
14The variance of the coefficients mi does not vanish, since we have assumed heteroge-
neous priors among subjects.
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Eq. (5) shows that the dispersion of short-run predictions reflects the
subjects’ heterogeneity regarding their priors. The linear extrapolation rule
amplifies quadratically the heterogeneity of priors across subjects, and there-
fore, an observed high degree of coordination of short-run predictions (k = 0)
should not be directly interpreted as a sign of homogeneous expectations re-
garding future price dynamics. Our simple example shows that the term
structure of predictions provides us with crucial information to characterize
the heterogeneity of expectations in LtFEs.
We generalize eq. (5) in order to obtain a more flexible expression for de-
scribing the term structure of expectations in our experimental data, without
necessarily assuming a linear forecasting rule:
Var[ip
e




where α represents the shape parameter of the term structure. More precisely,
the analysis of the parameter α helps us to have an approximate idea of
how much subjects disagree on the evolution of prices as a function of the
forecast horizon. In Appendix A, we provide the reader with some simple
illustrative examples of the connection between the forecasting rules and the
resulting term structure. Given the variance of short-run predictions, α = 0
means that the level of subjects’ disagreement about the future evolution of
prices does not depend on the forecast horizon. On the other hand, α <
0 implies that disagreement among subjects about future prices decreases,
eventually leading to an agreement on a particular future price level. Finally,
α > 0 implies that disagreement among subjects increases with the forecast
horizon: the higher the value of α is, the higher the disagreement of subjects
is regarding the future evolution of prices. In particular, for values of α
in the range 0 < α < 1, the term structure of expectations is concave,
signalling a moderate degree of disagreement among subjects. For the edge
value α = 1, the scaling is linear. For values α > 1, the term structure is
convex, which indicates a high degree of disagreement among subjects about
future price dynamics. A particular term structure of subjects’ disagreement
allows us to identify possible candidates for the expectations formation rules
used by subjects or discard certain expectations formation rules that are not
compatible with a given value of α.
In a setting with a positive expectations feedback system, Colasante et al.
(2018a,b) show that subjects anchor their short- and long-run expectations
to the last realized price15, helping the subjects to persistently coordinate
15Although many contributions in the LtFEs literature have shown that the last realized
price constitutes an anchor in the formation of expectations, they limit the forecasting
horizon to 1 or 2-steps ahead predictions.
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their short-run expectations. This anchor, however, turns out to be unstable
over time because of the typical oscillatory pattern of realized prices in mar-
kets characterized by a positive feedback. In the LtFE literature it has been
shown that subjects often tend to linearly extrapolate the past observed trend
of prices to predict the future price dynamics (see Hommes (2013)). Indeed,
the so-called extrapolative bias is a general phenomenon observed in various
markets; often economic agents tend to extrapolate or over-extrapolate the
observed increasing (decreasing) trend of the market price (see e.g. Barberis
et al. (1998), Hirshleifer (2001)). We argue, therefore, that if subjects lin-
early extrapolate the past trend of prices to form their long-run expectations
based on different priors, as in eq. (4), the level of disagreement across sub-
jects increases more than proportionally with the forecast horizon.
Hypothesis 2: Within a positive expectations feedback system, the term
structure of predictions exhibits a parabolic shape.
With regards to the negative feedback markets, Heemeijer et al. (2009)
have shown that prices exhibit a fast and stable convergence to the fundamen-
tal value, despite the lower degree of coordination of short-run expectations
as compared to the positive feedback system. Under the hypothesis that sub-
jects form their expectations using an anchor-and-adjustment rule, we argue
that stable dynamics of the anchor (namely the fast convergence of the real-
ized price to the fundamental value) can help subjects reduce the uncertainty
about the future short-run predictions of other subjects. In other words, it
becomes easier for the subjects to guesstimate in period t the other subjects’
short-run predictions at the beginning of period t + k. Subjects, therefore,
learn to anchor their short- as well as long-run predictions to the fundamen-
tal value and, consequently, we expect the degree of subjects disagreement to
be rather stable for different forecast horizons. This implies that the shape
parameter of the term structure is significantly lower than 1.
Hypothesis 3: Within a negative expectations feedback system, the term
structure of predictions exhibits a concave shape.
4 Results
Figures (1) and (2) show the dynamics of individual short-run predictions
and realized prices for the seven groups with positive feedback and the eight
groups with negative feedback. Figures (3) and (4) illustrate, as examples,
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the evolution over time of the price together with individual long-run predic-
tions in one of the groups in the positive and negative feedback treatment,
respectively. The other groups show similar patterns.
4.1 Analysis of short-run predictions
What Figures 1 and 2 clearly show is that, if the two expectations feedback
systems are compared, there are remarkably different patterns in the realized
prices. In the positive feedback treatment prices do not show a clear conver-
gence to the fundamental value. While in some groups prices exhibit some
kind of monotonic trend towards the fundamental value, in other groups a di-
verging trend can be observed. Concerning individual short-run predictions,
we observe that individual predictions coordinate after some initial periods
of volatility, although not necessarily around the fundamental value. On the
contrary, in the negative feedback treatment, realized prices converge to the
fundamental value after only a few periods, although it does take longer for
subjects’ short-run predictions to coordinate.
Differences in the convergence of prices to the fundamental value between
the positive and negative feedback treatments are quantified in Figure 5,
which displays the mean absolute difference between individual short-run










Figure 5 shows that, although the mean difference decreases in the first
five periods, in the markets with positive feedback subjects’ predictions do
not converge to the fundamental value. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows
that MAD
pf
t,t is significantly different from zero in all but the last period.
Conversely, in those markets with negative feedback, subjects’ predictions
converge to the fundamental value. Nevertheless, it takes some time for
the price to converge, since it is from period 8 that we observe (by running
a Wilcoxon signed-rank test) no statistically significant difference between
subjects’ predictions and the fundamental value. We also compare the values
of MAD
pf
t,t between treatments and we find that the median distance between
predictions and the fundamental value is significantly higher in the positive
feedback system compared to the negative feedback system.17
16The notation < ... >g denotes the average across groups.
17We compare treatments by conducting a Wilcoxon signed-rank test whose result con-
firm that the median value of MAD
pf
t,t is significantly higher in the positive feedback
system (z=19.71, p-value< 0.001)
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Given our results concerning the convergence of short-run predictions,
we can infer that in the positive feedback treatment the REE is not a good
benchmark to describe the subjects predictions nor the price dynamics. Our
results in the negative feedback treatment show that the individual predic-
tions and prices do converge to the REE. These results are in line with many
LtFEs reported in the literature.
Figure 6 quantifies the coordination of subjects’ individual short-run
predictions measured as the mean absolute deviation between individual 1-









In the markets with positive feedback, we observe a fast coordination of
subjects’ short-run predictions. Similar dynamics are observed in the mar-
kets with negative feedback, although it takes longer for short-run predictions
to coordinate.18 Hypotheses 1a and 1b cannot be rejected by the data. Our
results on coordination and convergence of short-run predictions are in line
with the literature: while there is fast convergence and slow coordination in
the negative feedback treatment, there is slow convergence and fast coordi-
nation in the positive feedback treatment.
We now focus on the analysis of individual forecasting behavior to fur-
ther confirm that our results are consistent with the literature. Following
Heemeijer et al. (2009), we estimate the individual prediction strategies of











t−k,t−k + iεt . (9)
We find that eq. (9) provides a good description of the forecasts of 78 out









18The comparison of MADCt,t between treatments, by means of Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, confirms that they are statistically different. In particular, MADCt,t in the negative
feedback treatment turns out to be significantly higher than that in the positive feedback
treatment up to period 10. From the peirod 10 on, the difference between positive and
negative feedback treatments is not statistically significant.
19We use the same specification of Heemeijer et al. (2009) and have adapted it to our
mathematical notation.
20We apply the Breusch-Godfrey test for small samples to check the autocorrelation of
the residuals.
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where iĉ, iα̂k and iβ̂k denote the individual estimates obtained from eq. (9).
Figure 7 shows that the distribution of the difference between the long-run
equilibrium price p̂ and the fundamental value pf
21 reproduces the main char-
acteristics described in Heemeijer et al. (2009): (i) in markets with negative
feedback, subjects are able to learn the REE, given that the distribution
of ip̂ − pf is highly concentrated around zero; (ii) in markets with positive
feedback, long-run equilibrium prices exhibit a higher dispersion around the
fundamental value.
Following Heemeijer et al. (2009), since the linear prediction rule is a
good descriptor of subjects’ forecasts, we estimate for each subject a simpler
prediction rule based on the anchor-and-adjustment heuristic. We classify
the subjects as näıve, adaptive, trend follower or fundamentalist depending
on the individual parameter values. The distribution of subjects among the
different categories is similar to that employed by Heemeijer et al. (2009): in
the positive feedback treatment roughly 70% of subjects behave as a trend
follower (either näıve or adaptive), whereas in the negative feedback treat-
ment 70% of subjects behave as a fundamentalist (see the Appendix C for
further details). The empirical analysis on the dynamics of short-run pre-
dictions and prices generalizes the results of Colasante et al. (2018a,b) to
the case of the negative feedback system. Therefore we can state that elic-
iting long-run expectations has no significant effect on subjects’ short-run
predictions, irrespective of the expectations feedback system.
4.2 Analysis of long-run predictions
When we first examine Figures 3 and 4, we observe a clear difference in the
dynamics of subjects’ long-run predictions depending on the implemented
feedback system. In the positive feedback treatment, subjects’ predictions,
although highly coordinated in the short-run around the last realized price,
follow a linear trend extrapolation with different slopes, forming a type of
cone-shaped trajectory. In contrast, in the negative feedback treatment, the
fluctuations of short- as well as long-run predictions exhibit a higher degree
of stability fluctuating around the fundamental value.
At first glance, the dynamics of long-run predictions seem to be strongly
influenced by the underlying expectations feedback system. In order to quan-
tify whether this is the case for long-run predictions we extend to long-run
predictions the analysis on the coordination of subjects’ predictions and their
21Since we have used two different fundamental values, in order to compare the long-
run equilibrium price convergence to the fundamental price across markets, we use the




Negative Feedback Positive Feedback
All periods period< 10 period≥ 10 All periods period< 10 period≥ 10
k = 2
-2.585 -2.950 -1.106 -14.835 -11.71 -8.985
(0.01) (0.003) (0.269) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
k = 4
-3.252 -5.659 2.414 -14.435 -11.984 -8.141
(0.001) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
k = 6
-7.578 -8.421 0.237 -12.382 -10.4 -6.69
(0.000) (0.000) (0.813) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Table 1: Wilcoxon test on the convergence of k-steps-ahead predictions to
the fundamental value in the positive and negative feedback treatments. We
report the z-values and the p-values in brackets.
convergence to the fundamental value. Figure 8 reports the average conver-
gence of long-run predictions to the fundamental value in the positive and
negative feedback treatments, measured as the mean absolute difference be-
tween the fundamental value and the predictions submitted in period t for










where k = 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9. Figure 8a shows the lack of convergence to the fun-
damental value of long-run predictions in the positive feedback treatment.
Concerning the negative feedback treatment, Figure 8b shows that conver-
gence significantly improves over time, reaching almost full convergence after
period 10. Table 1 confirms these findings. In early periods, the distance from
the fundamental value is statistically significant. We can conclude therefore
that, under a negative feedback system, subjects learn to converge to the
REE, since they coordinate their short and long-run predictions around the
fundamental value. On the other hand, under a positive feedback system,
subjects’ long-run predictions are not well described by the REE.
Figure 9 shows the coordination of subjects predictions measured as the









where k = 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9.
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Subjects learn to coordinate their short and long-run predictions over
time. Importantly, for a given period, the cross-sectional dispersion of pre-
dictions systematically increases with the forecast horizon, this effect being
much more pronounced in the positive feedback treatment. Note that our
results regarding coordination of long-run predictions (k > 0) are in line with
our findings for the 1-step-ahead predictions (k = 0).
4.3 Term structure of the cross-sectional dispersion of
subjects’ predictions
In Section 3 we conjectured that the evolution of the dispersion of subjects’
predictions over the forecast horizons contains information on the degree of
disagreement among subjects. We also suggested that the shape parameter
depends on the expectations feedback system. Figure 10 illustrates the evo-
lution of the term structure of the dispersion of predictions across periods
and treatments. A first glance at Figure 10 gives the impression that in the
positive feedback treatment the slope of the term structure is higher than in
the negative feedback treatment.
Let us now analyze the empirical properties of the term structure of ex-
pectations of eq. (6). In order to test Hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate
the value of the shape parameter α from a log-linearization of eq. (6) with








= α log(k + 1) . (13)
The normalization of the variances allows for a direct comparison of the
shape parameter of the term structure between the two treatments. Table
2 shows that the estimated values of α are significantly different from zero
in the two treatments. In particular, the case of the positive feedback treat-
ment, the estimated value of the shape parameter α is significantly smaller
than 2. This allows us to reject Hypotheses 2, i.e. a parabolic shape of
the term structure under a positive expectations feedback system. However,
the estimated value of α is significantly higher than 1, indicating a convex
term structure. Althought this might indicate that subjects follow extrapola-
tive rules, these rules are more complex than the simple linear extrapolative
rule assumed in Hypothesis 2. On the other hand, in the negative feedback
treatment the estimated value of the shape parameter α turns out to be sig-
nificantly smaller than 1, which indicates a concave term structure. Thus we
cannot reject Hypothesis 3.
We have conjectured that the concave shape of the term structure in the
negative feedback treatment is related to the fact that subjects anchor their
17
Negative feedback Positive feedback




∗∗∗ p-value < 0.01, ∗∗ p-value < 0.05, ∗ p-value < 0.1
Table 2: Results of the pooled panel regression from eq. (13). Dependent
variable: log of cross-sectional normalized variance of long-run predictions for
a given period and forecast horizon. We consider twelve periods t = 2, ..., 13
and ten horizons k = 1, ..., 10 (when possible).
predictions to the past realized price, which exhibits a fast and persistent
convergence to the fundamental value. In order to show that the convergence
of predictions to the fundamental value reduces the degree of disagreement
among subjects over the different forecast horizons, we introduce a similar
functional form as in eq. (6) which relates the mean squared deviation of












MSDpft,t+k = (k + 1)
µ MSDpft,t . (15)
Next we estimate the corresponding parameter µ for the positive and
negative feedback treatments.22 Table 3 shows that the estimated value of
the shape parameter µ is not statistically different from the estimated value
of α in the negative feedback treatment. This is consistent with our conjec-
ture that the convergence of predictions to the fundamental value and their
mutual coordination are closely related. This close relationship between co-
ordination and convergence of the dynamics does not hold in the positive
feedback treatment, and therefore the estimated values for µ do not provide
any relevant information, since long-run predictions do not converge nor co-
ordinate around the fundamental value.
22We use the same pooled panel regression of the normalized variances as in eq. (13).
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∗∗∗ p-value < 0.01, ∗∗ p-value < 0.05, ∗ p-value < 0.1
Table 3: Results of the pooled panel regression from eq. (15). Dependent
variable: log of average quadratic difference between individual long-run
predictions pet,t+k and the fundamental value. We consider twelve periods
t = 2, ..., 13 and ten forecast horizons k = 1, ..., 10 (when possible).
5 Conclusion
We conduct a LtFEs where we simultaneously elicit short and long-run expec-
tations about the evolution of the price in experimental markets characterized
by different expectations feedback systems. In particular, we generalize the
original contribution of Heemeijer et al. (2009) which elicits short-run expec-
tations and extend the results of Colasante et al. (2018a,b) to markets with
a negative expectations feedback system.
Our empirical analysis suggests that, in order to characterize the het-
erogeneity of expectations it is extremely informative to measure not only
the level of dispersion of subjects’ expectations, but also to explore how it
evolves over different forecasting horizons. We propose a simple term struc-
ture model for cross-sectional dispersion of expectations, which is defined
by only one parameter, i.e the shape coefficient. The estimated values of
the shape coefficient in our experimental data turn out to provide important
clues about how the feedback system affects the mechanism of formation of
(long-run) expectations. In particular, in the markets with positive feedback
the estimated value of the shape coefficient indicates a convex term structure
signalling a high level of disagreement among forecasters. This is compati-
ble with an (heterogeneous) extrapolative trend behavior of subjects when
forming their expectations. On the other hand, a concave shape character-
izes the term structure in the markets with negative feedback, pointing to a
smoother evolution of forecasters disagreement. We argue that this behavior
is a consequence of the stable convergence of the price to the fundamental
value, which helps the subjects predict more accurately the behavior of other
subjects and, therefore, the dynamics of future prices.
Concerning the dynamics of prices and expectations, our results reveal
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that eliciting long-run expectations does not influence subjects’ short-run
expectations. In fact we observe the same aggregate patterns of coordina-
tion and convergence of short-run expectations, as well as price dynamics,
reported in the LtFEs literature. When extending the time spectrum of sub-
jects’ expectations, we find that in the negative feedback markets, subjects
learn the REE, since they coordinate their short and long-run expectations
around the fundamental value. After a learning phase the REE turns out to
be a good predictor of the dynamics of expectations irrespective of the fore-
cast horizon. Conversely, in the positive feedback markets, the REE does
not predict the evolution of subjects’ expectations, in the short- nor in the
long-run. Instead, subjects learn to coordinate their short-run expectations
around the last realized price, and tend to extrapolate past trend prices when
forming their long-run expectations.
From a more methodological perspective, we are firmly convinced that
eliciting long-run expectations in the framework of the LtFEs complements
the macroeconomic literature based on surveys about the origin of hetero-
geneity in expectations. Additionally, it can be successfully employed as
testbed for studying economic policy measures within diverse macroeconomic
scenarios.
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Figure 1: Realized price and individual short-run predictions of all groups
in the positive feedback treatment. The black solid line represents the
realized price, the grey lines are the individual one-step-ahead predictions
and the dashed line represents the fundamental value. In groups 1, 2 and 7
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Figure 2: Realized price and individual short-run predictions of all groups
in the negative feedback treatment. The black solid line represents the
realized price, the grey lines are the individual one-step-ahead predictions
and the dashed line represents the fundamental value. In groups 1, 2, 3 and
4 pf = 65, while in groups 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 pf = 70.
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Figure 3: Positive feedback:Individual long-run predictions of Group 4. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
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Figure 4: Negative feedback: Individual long-run predictions of Group 7. The
black dots indicate the realized price, the grey lines the individual forecasts
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Figure 5: Convergence of short-run predictions: MAD
pf
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Figure 7: Violin diagram of the distance between the long-run equilibrium
price computed following eq. (10) and the fundamental value in the negative
and positive feedback treatments. The white dot represents the median value
equal to 0.26 and -2.25 for the negative and positive feedback treatment,
respectively. In the two treatments a Wilcoxon signed-rank test show no







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
MAD 1 step MAD 2 step MAD 3 step
MAD 5 step MAD 7 step MAD 10 step





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
MAD 1 step MAD 2 step MAD 3 step
MAD 5 step MAD 7 step MAD 10 step
(b) Negative feedback treatment
Figure 8: For each period t = 1, ..., 20, it is displayed the mean absolute
deviations between the predictions and the fundamental value for different
forecast horizons k = 0, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9 (MAD
pf
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(b) Negative feedback treatment
Figure 9: For each period t = 1, ..., 20 it is displayed the across groups average
MADC of the subjects’ forecasts submitted in period t for the price at the
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Figure 10: Empirical term structure of the cross-sectional dispersion of expec-
tations: Each histogram displays the variance of the predictions submitted
in a given period for different forecast horizons (in the horizontal axis) in
the positive and negative feedback treatments. We consider twelve periods
t = 2, ..., 13 and ten horizons k = 1, ..., 10 (when possible).
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A Term structure of cross-sectional disper-
sion of expectations
In this appendix we provide some simple examples of how a given forecasting
rule affects the term structure of cross-sectional dispersion of expectations.
Let us assume that the subjects, when forming their long run expecta-
tions, linearly extrapolate the past price change with a coefficient mi depend-
ing on each individual subject. Considering eq. (4), it is possible to compute
the average expectation across subjects:
E[ip
e
t,t+k] = pt−1 + E[mi] (k + 1)(pt−1 − pt−2) . (16)
The variance of the expectations is therefore:
Var[ip
e
t,t+k] = Var[mi] (k + 1)




t,t] = Var[mi] (pt−1 − pt−2)2 , (18)
and plugging it into eq. (17), the term structure is:
Var[ip
e




An alternative to the linear forecasting rule is a “random walk rule”,
whose starting value is the realized price in the previous period:
ip
e




where iηt+k are iid random variables with E[iηt+k] = 0 for each k and i.
Under the rule of eq. (20), it is easy to show that the term structure of the
variance is linear in the forecasting horizon:
Var[ip
e
t,t+h+1] = (k + 1) Var[ip
e
t,t] . (21)




t,t+k = pt−1 + iξt+k , (22)
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where ξt are iid random variables with E[iξt] = 0 for each t and i. The vari-










A more general term structure for the dispersion of the predictions ex-
hibits a curvature which depends on the shape parameter α:
Var[ip
e




which nests all the previous specific cases.
These simple calculations show that the term structure of the variance of
subjects’ predictions can be extremely informative about the possible under-
lying rules for the formation of long-run expectations.
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B Instructions and Screenshot
B.1 Translated instructions
(from the original in Spanish)
[General instructions]
Welcome to the Laboratory of Experimental Economics! You are par-
ticipating in an experiment in which you will take decisions in a financial
market. The instructions are very simple but, please, read them carefully.
During the whole experiment you will play with experimental currency
unit (ECU) and, at the end of the experiment, your final profit, which will
be added to a show-up fee of 3 euros, will be converted into euro according
to the following exchange rate: 1 Euro=500 ECU. The total amount will
be paid at the end of the experiment in cash.
[Only in the positive feedback treatment]
You are a financial advisor to a pension fund that wants to invest an
amount of money to buy an asset. The pension fund has to choose between
investing its money in a bank account which pays fixed interest rate and a
risky asset that pays dividends. The allocation depends on your forecast for
the evolution of the asset price. When making your predictions remember
that the asset price in each period is affected as follows: positively by the
dividend, negatively by the interest rate and positively by the investors’ ex-
pectations of the asset price in that period.
Your task is to predict the price for 20 periods. In each period (t) you
will predict the price for all the remaining 20 − t periods, i.e. in period 1
you will submit 20 predictions starting from the prediction about the price
at the end of period 1, in period 2 you will submit 19 predictions and so on.
Your predictions must be between 0 and 100.
In period 1 you will submit predictions with information only about the
interest rate and the average dividend. From period 2 onwards, you will have
more information: a graph with the time series of your past predictions and
the time series of the market prices. The green dots represent the time se-
ries of your 1-step-ahead predictions, while the blue dots represent the asset
price in each period. Additionally, you will see the values of these time series
and the time series of all your past predictions. Remember that in any pe-
riod you will see the information about the asset price in the previous periods.
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The interest rate will be equal to 5% and the mean dividend will be equal
to 3.25 (or 3.5 depending on the session).
[Only in the negative feedback treatment]
You are an advisor to a firm that wants to buy a certain amount of a
particular good. In each period, the manager of the firm decides how many
units of this particular good she wants to buy with the aim of selling it in
the next period. To take an optimal decision, the manager needs a good pre-
diction of the market price in the next period. The evolution of the market
price will be as follows: if the demand for the good is higher than the supply,
the price will rise. Conversely, if the supply is higher than the demand, the
price will decrease. The manager will take his/her decision based on your
predictions about the market price in given period: the higher (lower) the
prediction is, the higher (lower) the demand will be and, as a consequence,
the market price will fall (rise).
Your task is to predict the price for 20 periods. In each period (t) you
will predict the price for all the remaining 20-t periods, i.e. in period 1 you
will submit 20 predictions starting from the prediction about the price at the
end of period 1, in period 2 you will submit 19 predictions and so on. Your
predictions must be between 0 and 100.
In period 1 you will submit predictions without any information about
past prices. From period 2 onwards, you will see a graph with the time series
of your past predictions and the time series of the prices. The green dots
represent the time series of your 1-step-ahead predictions, while the blue
dots represent the market price in each period. Additionally, you will see the
values of those time series and the time series of all your past predictions.
Remember that in any period you will see the information about the market
price of the previous periods.
[General instructions]
Once each subject has submitted his/her prediction for each period, the
price will be computed and it will be shown at the beginning of period 2.
The same mechanism will be used for subsequent periods. Once you and the
other subjects submit the predictions, the price as well as the profits will be
computed according to the forecasting accuracy.
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Remember that your profit depends on your forecasting accuracy. The
lower your forecasting error (the distance between your predictions and the
price in a given period), the higher your profit will be. Your profit will be
computed at the end of each period. In addition to the profit for your 1-
step-ahead prediction each period, you will receive an extra profit for your
past predictions about the price for each period. This extra profit will be
computed according to the following table:
Difference between price of






At the beginning of each period you will see the profit for all the predic-
tions and the cumulative gains.
B.2 Screenshot
36
Figure 11: Screen-shot of the experiment.
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C Individual prediction strategies




t,t = α1pt−1 + α2 ip
e
t−1,t−1 + (1− α1 − α2)pf + β(pt−1 − pt−2) + εt (25)
The heuristic described in eq. (25) can be successfully estimated for 72
out of 90 subjects. Using the estimates obtained we can classify subjects as:
(i) Fundamentalist in the negative feedback treatment: α1 + α2 ≈ 0 and
β = 0
(ii) Adaptive: α1 + α2 6= 0 and β = 0
(iii) Näıve: α1 ≈ 1 and α2 = β = 0;
(iv) Näıve and fundamentalist: α1 < 1 and α2 = β = 0
(v) Adaptive trend follower in the positive feedback treatment: α1 6=
0, α2 6= 0 and β 6= 0
(vi) Näıve trend follower in the positive feedback treatment: α1 6= 0, α2 = 0
and β 6= 0
(vii) Trend follower in the positive feedback treatment: α1 = 0, α2 = 0
Tables 4 and 5 summarize our results and compare them with those reported
in Heemeijer et al. (2009).
Prediction strategies Our results Heemeijer et al. (2009)
Näıve trend follower 34% 38%
Adaptive trend follower 21% 33%
Trend follower 16% -
None 29% 29%
Observations 38 over 42 21 over 42
Table 4: Positive feedback treatment: individual prediction strategies ac-
cording to the estimated parameters in eq.(25).
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Prediction strategy Our results Heemeijer et al. (2009)
Fundamentalist 36% 37%




Observations 34 over 48 19 over 36
Table 5: Negative feedback treatment: individual prediction strategies ac-
cording to the estimated parameters in eq.(25).
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